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I. Introduction 
 
“Historically, the process of European integration has proceeded on the 
presumption that the legitimacy of the European Union (EU) emanates from its 
capacity to deliver the wanted results. “(Lindgren & Persson 2010, 450) 
 
Recently, this presumption has once again gained importance as measures taken, to 
increase the input-legitimacy of the EU, such as the empowerment of the European 
Parliament and the Commission’s emphasis on stronger interaction with regional and 
local governments and civil society, have not proven to generate the wanted boost in 
the perceived legitimacy of the EU. The difficulty of ratifying the Lisbon Treaty in 
2007, for example, raises the question, if despite the strengthening of the input side 
of legitimacy, the legitimacy of the EU’s output has not been improving at the same 
rate. In my Magister-Thesis I want to tackle this question, analyzing if the EU’s 
outputs concur with the preferences of its citizens.  
 
“The concept of legitimacy refers to the acceptability of a social or political order. For 
an institution to be legitimate, it has to rest on the passive support (at a minimum) of 
the people whom its policies affect” (Lindgren & Persson 2010, 450). Traditionally 
democratic legitimacy is seen as a function of the representativeness of a political 
system (Pollack 2007), which is usually established by the election of representatives 
by the subjects that are to be represented – the European Union however is “ a 
unique political phenomenon, hard to classify with traditional political concepts“, as it 
is “neither a state, nor a supranational government” (DeBardeleben & Hurrelmann 
2007, 2). In their paper on policy representation in the European Union, Jacques 
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Thomassen and Hermann Schmitt therefore draw upon an alternative definition of 
democratic legitimacy given by Luttbeg1, according to which a system of 
representation is democratic when “political leaders act in accordance with the wants, 
needs and demands of the public in making government policy” (Thomassen & 
Schmitt 1997, 165).   
 
The key question, Thomassen and Schmitt go on to say, is then to what extent 
political leaders act in accordance with the will of the people.  Using this definition, 
they reason that the effectiveness of political representation depends on the 
interaction between political parties and their voters – I however think, that as the 
MEPs are not the only political leaders of the European Union (The commission and 
the council play an equally important part in the EU-decision-making-process as the 
EP), the party voter congruence can not necessarily tell us truthfully if policy is 
formed and implemented in accordance with the wants, needs and demands of the 
European public.  
 
In his article on the minimalist conception of democracy, Adam Przeworski names 
another way of assessing “whether or not a government is representative, in the 
sense that it acts in the best interest of the public: (1) if the people (or at least a 
majority of them; see below) has a will, then the government is representative if it 
implements this will (Przeworski 1999, 32-33)”. 
 
Analyzing the concurrence of the EU’s output with the public will is therefore precisely 
what I propose to do in this thesis. 
 
                                            
1
 Luttbeg, N.R.(Ed.) (1974): Public opinion and public policy: Models of political linkage, 3rd Edit., 
Ithaca, NY: F.E. Peacock, cited in Thomassen & Schmitt 1997 
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Why is it important to assess the quality of representation in the European Union? 
For one thing, as David M. Farell and Roger Scully explain in their book on 
parliamentary representation in the EU, since the early 1990s, public dissatisfaction 
with the European integration project has generally increased, and the previous 
‘permissive consensus’ has been called into question. Historically it may have been 
true that the public would be willing to accede to whatever amount of integration 
political elites wished to give them, but this is  clearly is not true now (Farell & Scully 
2007). This trend of public dissatisfaction has grown so strong that it has received the 
title ‘Euroscepticism’ and an extensive body of literature dedicated to its analysis has 
evolved around it. For politicians to react appropriately to this trend they must know 
where it comes from – one possible source may be the malrepresentation of the 
wants and needs of the European People.  
 
And secondly, and more importantly, assessing representation in the European 
Union has to do with democratic legitimacy. All the member states of the EU claim to 
be democratic systems – but can they be such, if the EU isn’t?  The competences of 
the EU have grown continuously over the decades, and there are areas, such as the 
customs unit, economic and monetary policy, and competition laws in which the EU 
holds exclusive legislative power and the member states take no decisions and do 
not interfere (European Union 2010). If in these areas the EU decision-making-
mechanisms do not systematically cause EU output to be representative, then the EU 
cannot be called a democratic system (Przeworski 1999), and subsequently the 
member state’s claim of democracy will be injured.  
A lot of work has been published on the democratic weakness of the institutional 
structure of the European Union, especially on the underdeveloped competences of 
the European parliament (e.g. Thomassen & Schmitt 1997; Lord & Beetham 2001), 
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but what has been almost completely neglected is the assessment of the actual 
output of the Union. My research question is therefore:  
 
Do EU outputs concur with the preferences of the European citizens? 
 
In the EU, there is concurrence if the division of powers (or in other words the 
allocation of competences) is modelled according to the wishes of the European 
public, if the process of enlargement continues or halts with the preferences of the 
EU’s citizens, and if the content implemented in traditional areas to some degree 
reflects the opinion of a majority of Europeans.  
 
All of these relations between output and public opinion are extremely complicated to 
analyze, especially as very detailed data on public opinion is needed. Because of 
this, I will concentrate on one group of outputs, for which I have access to satisfactory 
data: the allocation of competences in the EU. Cerniglia and Pagani (2007) have 
empirically studied data on the citizen preferences towards the allocation of 
competences collected in the Eurobarometer surveys of the years 1998-2003 and I 
will compare the findings of their research with the findings of a paper by Alesina et 
al. (2001), which constructs indicators to measure the actual allocation of 
competences in the EU. 
 
In the first part of this thesis I will review the most important findings of literature on 
legitimacy in the EU, reflecting the different conceptions of legitimacy and highlighting 
the recent turn of the debate towards the output side of legitimacy. I will proceed to 
describe the relationship between input and output legitimacy, showing, that at the 
moment the scope for improving input is very narrow and therefore the legitimacy of 
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EU output has become indispensable. Then I will continue with the empirical part of 
my thesis, first explaining my hypotheses derived from the theoretical review and 
then describing the methods and data used in the empirical analysis.   Then I will test 
my hypotheses empirically and incorporate my findings into the current body of 
research on legitimacy.  
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II. Legitimacy Theory and the European Union 
 
 a) What is Legitimacy? 
 
Legitimacy “addresses the fundamental problem of political systems – to find 
acceptance for exercises of governing authority that run counter to the interests or 
preferences of the governed”2 (Scharpf 2007, 301). It is therefore a functional 
prerequisite of efficient and liberal forms of government and reduces the need for and 
the cost of controls and sanctions otherwise needed to enforce compliance of the 
governed.  
 
Historically, there have been many different sources of legitimacy but today 
“democracy is virtually uncontested as a normative standard for assessing the 
legitimacy of political systems” (DeBardeleben & Hurrelman 2007, 1).  This proves an 
interesting relationship, as democracy is “a system of political decision making in 
which major decisions of public policy depend in some systematic way upon the 
opinions of the bulk of the members of the relevant political community” (Weale 1998, 
50-51).  
These members have given their consent to a selection of representatives that make 
policy decisions, to the rules and procedures through which these decisions are 
taken and to the institutions which organise their implementation. (Blühdorn 2009, 9). 
The idea is that if the policy decisions reflect the peoples’, the demos’, interests most 
of the time, the decisions that contradict them will be tolerated as well.  
 
                                            
2
 Luhman, N. (1969) cited in Scharpf 2007 
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Two distinct traditions of political philosophy shape current normative discourses in 
Western constitutional democracies: they are conventionally labelled ‘republican’ and 
liberal’ democracy (Scharpf 2009).   
 
The republican tradition, founded in Aristotle’s political philosophy, has the polity as 
its first priority – the power of the government should be employed for the ‘common 
good’. The obstacles to overcome are the virtuousness of the governors and the 
transformation of the ‘volontés de tous’ to a ‘volonté générale’. Over time this theory 
of thought led to the invention of representative democracy, with its main features of 
public deliberation and electoral accountability, securing equality through universal 
suffrage.  
 
The liberal tradition on the other hand is younger, starting with Thomas Hobbes and 
the early modern period. It places priority on the individual; the necessity of a 
governing state rests upon the need to protect individual interests. Defining features 
of liberal democracies are limitations on the governing powers through checks and 
balances and pluralist patterns of interest intermediation. Decisions should be based 
on “the consensus of interests affected rather than on majority votes” (Scharpf 2009. 
319).  
 
Legitimacy in Western democracies incorporates normative arguments from both of 
these theories of democracy: Constitutionally constrained governing powers, the 
protections of human rights and the access of plural interests to the policy-making 
process by which they are affected are typical liberal features of democracy; 
governing authority obtained by regular, free and equal elections in which policy 
choices are generated in public debates and through the competition of political 
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parties as well as institutions that work in an environment of democratic majorities or 
at least of a democratic pouvoir constituant, even if they are exempt from direct 
electoral accountability, are typical republican features found in most Western 
democracies (Scharpf 2009).  
 
This demonstrates the versatility of legitimacy – Max Weber (1918) (Lord 2000) 
broadly distinguishes two categories of legitimacy: substantive legitimacy, referring to 
what governments do and procedural legitimacy, referring to how they get it done.  
This input/ouput-oriented perspective has become very influential in recent legitimacy 
theory, especially in connection with the European Union (EU).  
 
Input legitimacy, which is more comprehensive than procedural legitimacy, refers not 
only to public control through elections and other systematic processes and 
possibilities for participation, but also to political equality and a sense of identity 
among the governed. Output legitimacy depends on the performance in meeting the 
needs and values of citizens (Lord & Beetham 2001; Wiesner 2008). 
 
These theoretical considerations have been developed with a distinct political system 
in mind: the nation state. When studying the legitimacy of the EU therefore, the 
analysis has to be adapted to this different kind of polity. The transformation of 
governing relationships has made it more complex to operationalize democratic 
standards and it is debatable whether democracy is realized and whether it can be 
realized (DeBardeleben & Hurrelman 2007, 1).  
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In this new multi-level governance system  
 “[d]emocracy needs to be rethought on the assumption that it has no primary locus and no 
single demos; the national state shares power with increasingly salient sub-national governments, with 
proliferating forms of network and partnership governance, with a variety of quasi public and private 
organizations, with NGOs, and with international agencies and other forms of supra-national 
governance.3” (DeBardeleben & Hurrelman 2007, p. 5) 
 
The EU has to balance a double conflict of identity and common interests the conflict 
between individual interests and national common interests and the conflict between 
individual national interests and supranational common interests.  
In the following I will describe the development of legitimacy theory concerning the 
EU. 
 
 
 b) Era of the Permissive Consensus 
 
At the beginning of the European Integration project, the need to address questions 
of legitimacy was not acute. For one, it was generally assumed, that the then 
European Community (EC) was indirectly legitimated through its member states, all 
legitimate governments themselves. Moreover, integration was largely an elite affair 
for which the public had little interest except for the efficient production of useful 
policy outputs. This reflects the then predominant functionalist understanding of 
integration – for Monnet, one of the ‘founding fathers’ of the Union, the community’s 
legitimacy and raison d’être was to generate Pareto-efficient outcomes, peace and 
prosperity (Craig 2011, 16; Lord & Beetham 2001; Lindgren & Person 2010).   
 
                                            
3
 Hirst, P.: Democracy and Governance’ in Pierre, J. (Ed.), Debating Governance: Authority, Steering 
and Democracy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 24, cited in DeBardeleben &Hurrelmann 2007 
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In the 1970s Leon Lindberg and Stuart Steingold described this situation as the 
‘permissive consensus’, assuming that the European population supports the broad 
goals of the integration project, and treats European institutions as ‘an accepted part 
of the political landscape’, there being therefore no danger of widespread and 
focused popular opposition (Hurrelmann 2007, 352). 
 
Considering the initial limited popular participation in, and identification with, the EU 
and the consequent possibility of policy decisions that do not reflect popular wishes, 
there was however always the concern that public opinion about the future of Europe 
was somewhat fragile (Norris 1997). This concern was countered with the notion of 
deferred gratification, which admits to the fact that relying on a mixture of 
technocratic and indirect legitimation might not be ideal, but suggests that it could be 
easier to tackle complex questions of democratisation and identity formation after 
people had gained practical experience with the institutions in need of legitimation 
(Lord 2000) 
 
Also, “in the case of the EU, uncertainty as to whether the European electorate is 
capable of feeling itself to be a ‘people’ whose popular sovereignty is acceptable to 
all led” (Lord & Beetham 1998, 25) and the fear that effective decision-making would 
be impeded, deferred the development of a traditional representative democratic 
institutional setting.  
 
Yet, having been delicate all along, the breakdown of the ‘permissive consensus’ 
became evident in the early 1990s. The defeat of the proposal to adopt the 
Maastricht Treaty in the Danish referendum in 1992, a sharp fall in public support 
towards the EU across the standard indicators in the Eurobarometer, opposition by 
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intense minorities to farming and fisheries policies, a record apathy in voter turnout 
and gains for anti-Maastricht protest parties in France, Denmark and Spain all 
indicate that somewhere the interests of the EU elites and the EU population had 
parted (Norris 1997). 
 
 
 c) Maastricht and Input-Turn 
 
The debates over Maastricht drew the attention of politicians and scholars alike to 
matters of legitimacy in the EU. They demonstrated the vulnerability of the Union to 
popular countermobilisation and questioned the presumption of broad consent to the 
elite project claimed by the ‘permissive consensus’. By pushing the EU towards being 
a political system of its own right, the necessity to secure public support for the 
expansion of the Union’s powers and direct legitimacy from institutions that exercise 
these powers was heightened (Lord & Beetham 1998; Føllesdal 2006).  
 
The introduction of majority voting, the strengthening of autonomous supranational 
institutions and new policy competences in questions of value such as fishing quotas 
and abortion rights undercut the old arguments of indirect legitimation and delivered 
outputs – the need for a basis of legitimacy that allowed the EU to please some and 
disappoint others became apparent (Føllesdal 2006, Lord & Beetham 1998; Lord 
2000), also reflecting the intergovernmental turn in integration theory that had 
developed to come to terms with events that couldn’t be satisfyingly explained by 
Functionalism: “Liberal intergovernmentalism seeks to explain the rationale for 
integration and the distribution of political authority within the Community. It raises 
 16
interesting questions as to the role of democracy within this schema, and the 
conception of democracy that flows from it.” (Craig 2011, 19) 
 
 The discussion on legitimacy has been vibrant since then, yet  disagreement among 
scholars about the symptoms, diagnoses and prognosis for tackling whatever 
legitimacy deficit there might be, has not been resolved (Føllesdal 2006). There can 
be no single meaning of the ‘democratic deficit’ (Føllesdal & Hix 2006), as its quality 
depends solely on the normative standards of legitimacy applied in the analysis.  
 
 Democratic Deficit of the EU 
 
Lord and Beetham (1998) argue that one should apply the same standards to the EU 
as to liberal democratic states, independent of the Unions complexity and multi-level 
character.  In this view government of, by and for the people is essential and 
achieved under certain specific condition. Government of the people addresses the 
rights and possibilities of citizens for participation and contestation, whereas 
universal and equal access to the elections of representatives guarantees 
government by the people. These representatives must be accountable, the election 
as well as all government processes must be transparent and subject to a rule of law 
and the separation of powers implemented. Government for the people refers to an 
output dimension inherent to representative democracy: decisions taken by the 
representatives should satisfy the majority of the represented (Wiesner 2008).  
 
In the literature applying these standards to assess the legitimacy of the EU one can 
distinguish two threads of argumentation. One is demos-based and stresses the 
population’s lacking European democratic identity, the deficient European public 
 17
space and the underdeveloped European civil society. The other is institution-based 
and stresses the fact that the EU does not meet the criteria of modern representative 
democracy and the separation of powers (Wiesner 2008).  
 
These two arguments go hand in hand. The fact that “European publics identify 
overwhelmingly more strongly with their member states than with the EU” (Lord 2000, 
5) and the lack of ‘European elections’ and ‘European Parties’ (as the European 
Parliament elections are treated as mid-term national contests) lead to an insufficient 
influence of EU citizens’ preferences on issues on the EU policy agenda, causing an 
inadequate representation of citizens by the MEPs (Føllesdal & Hix 2006).   
 
Even if this were not the case, citizen representation would still fall short of that in 
traditional representative democracies due to the comparative legislative weakness 
of the parliament towards the Council, as still only a smaller part of policies are 
passed under the co-decision procedure in which the EP has equal legislative power.  
 
Also, the shift to multilevel governance has increased the number of access points for 
political participation, which leads to a more deliberative style of policy-making. 
Deliberation tends to privilege participants with superior resources, therefore again 
leading to unequal representation of citizens (DeBardeleben & Hurrelmann 2007, 7).  
 
Another problem that appears when scrutinizing the EU through the eyes of 
representative democracy is the potential for judicial legislation, that “is greater in the 
EU than under any national constitution” (Scharpf 2007, 307). The Court’s 
responsibility to interpret the law of the Treaties and secondary European law was 
established intentionally, but the “boldness with which it would establish the docrines 
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claiming ‘direct effect’ and ‘supremacy’ for European Law”4 (Ibid, 306) was not 
foreseen. Also, member states and the European parliament have no say in matters 
of monetary policy determined by the ECB or the proposal of legislative initiatives or 
the prosecution of Treaty violations monopolized by the Commission. Together, these 
conditions constitute considerable deficits in the EU institutional system concerning 
the ideal of a separation of powers (Wiesner 2008).  
 
Related to this fusion of powers throughout the institutions is the weak potential for 
sanctioning unpopular or failed policies (DeBardeleben & Hurrelmann 2007). As long 
as a policy is still supported by either the Commission (who has the monopoly of 
policy initiative) or by a small blocking minority in the council, it will remain in force 
and cannot be reformed (Scharpf 2009). The European governing elite is therefore 
far less accountable to its citizens than in most contemporary democracies.  
 
The result of this confusing new form of polity, where the Commission is neither a 
government nor a bureaucracy and the council is part legislative and part executive 
and when acting as a legislator makes most of its decisions behind closed doors 
(Føllesdal & Hix 2006), is an opaqueness and a distance between the EU and its 
citizens that is hard to bridge.  The unequal and insufficient representation of citizen 
preferences and the difficulty of reversing policy decisions, produce a polity drift from 
the voters’ policy preferences (Wiesner 2008). Also “[t]he shifting blame on to EU 
institutions, the displacement of national legitimation problems into the European 
arena without matching resources, and the cartelization of the interface between 
states and Union by bureaucratic elites, are all well-documented sources of 
delegitimation.” (Lord & Beetham 2001, 444) 
                                            
4
 De Witte, B. (1999): The Evolution of Law. Oxford University Press, Oxford 
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 Criticism of the Democratic Deficit 
 
This diagnosis of a legitimacy deficit in the EU is not without controversy; some 
question the symptoms, stating that despite the falling support for European 
integration, public opinion is still highly in favour of it – others question the necessity 
of the Union to meet the same democratic standards as other contemporary 
democracies, being a rather different political system. The most prominent opponents 
of the ‘democratic deficit’ in the EU are Majone and Moravcsik.  
 
Majone argues that as long as the majority of EU citizens are against forming a 
European federation, but support economic integration, EU parliamentary democracy 
cannot be expected to flourish. Economic integration without accompanying political 
integration can only work if politics and economics are kept as separate as possible – 
this depoliticisation is the price of keeping national sovereignty intact and reflects the 
preferences of the voters, thus being democratically justified (Majone 1998). In 
addition Majone claims that the EU is essentially a ‘regulatory state’ that addresses 
market failures “and so, by definition, is about producing policy outcomes that are 
Pareto-efficient (where some benefit and no one is made worse off), rather than 
redistributive or value-allocative (where there are both winners and losers)” (Føllesdal 
& Hix 2006, 537). If one accepts this ‘regulatory model’ of the EC, then, as long as 
the tasks assigned to the Eurpean level are precisely and narrowly defined, non-
majoritarian standards of legitimacy should be acceptable to justify the delegation of 
the necessary powers (Majone 1998). Majone recommends keeping the institutional 
‘democratic deficit’ in order not to impair the problem-solving capacity of the Union. 
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Moravcsik goes further than Majone, and presents a comprehensive critique of all 
dominant democratic deficit claims (Føllesdal & Hix 2006), coming to the conclusion 
that even when evaluated by the norms of existing nation-states and in the context of 
a multi-level system, there is little evidence that the EU suffers from a fundamental 
democratic deficit (Majone 2002).  He argues that since the democratically controlled 
national executives play dominant roles in the EU institutions, indirect accountability 
is weak only in supranational areas where particular national governments could 
otherwise be on the losing side on an issue-by-issue basis. The EU however has 
responded to this difficulty by increasing the powers of the European Parliament in 
these areas. Moravcsik claims that “[c]onstitutional checks and balances, indirect 
democratic control via national governments, and the increasing powers of the 
European Parliament are sufficient to ensure that EU policy-making is, in nearly all 
cases, clean, transparent, effective and politically responsive to the demands of 
European citizens” (Moravcsik 2002, 605).  
 
Majone and Moravcsik share their appreciation of EU policy-making being largely 
isolated from majoritarian democratic contests. Moravcsik5 argues that regulatory 
policy-making benefits from being independent of democratic majority by cutting back 
the costs of universal involvement, by allowing the protection of minority rights from 
the ‘tyranny of the majority’ and by protecting policy-decisions from being captured by 
particularist interests (Føllesdal & Hix 2006).  
Responses to Majone’s and Moravcsik’s positions are numerous. Majone’s claim of 
the EU’s actions merely being regulatory in economic issues is highly contested. 
Craig (2011, 39) points out that the EU “exercises significant power over political, 
social, and economic issues, ever more so with the increasing EU activity in relation 
                                            
5
 Morivcsik(2002) and Moravcsik(2004) 
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to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice”. Lord and Beetham (2001) argue that 
the EU is indeed very much a reallocative polity. Although it does so by legislation 
more than by budgets, the Union affects distribution of values, resources and 
entitlements between states, regions, generations, the sexes and forms of economic 
activity. Moravcsik’s argument that the EU is legitimate because of the cooperation of 
national governments and the European parliament is criticised only to be true for the 
“‘political modes’ of EU policy making in which the governments of member states 
have a controlling role, but it does not apply to the ‘non-political modes’ in which the 
Commission, the Court and the Central Bank are able to impose policy choices 
without any involvement of member governments, or the European Parliament for 
that matter”6 (Scharpf 2007, 305).  
 
Besides these arguments, Wiesner (2008) considers the results of EU referenda 
since Maastricht to be empirical indicators for the fact that Majone’s and Moravcsik’s 
models are not maintainable anymore.  
 
 
 d) Legitimacy in the new Millennium 
 
In 2001 the first referendum on the Nice Treaty turned out negatively in Ireland; in 
Spring 2005 the constitutional process was brought to a halt by negative 
referendums in France and the Netherland, two founding members of the EEC; and 
the Lisbon Treaty, drafted and signed in 2007, was not ratified until 2009, again partly 
due to a negative referendum in Ireland.  These treaties were all aimed at enhancing 
the efficiency and democratic legitimacy of the Union and at improving the coherence 
                                            
6
 Scharpf (2002) 
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of its actions (Treaty of Lisbon, 2007). The scope of parliamentary involvement in 
European legislation was continually increased and the use of the co-decision 
procedure extended to a growing number of policy areas, aimed at giving the 
parliament an equal stand with the Council. In the Treaty of Lisbon, national 
parliaments were recognized as part of the democratic system of the Union for the 
first time, receiving the role of ‘watchdogs’ of subsidiarity which allows them to issue 
concerns before a legislative proposal is considered in detail by the European 
parliament and the Council. In Lisbon, the involvement of citizens in the policy-
process was also an important theme – the ‘Citizen’s Initiative’ was included in the 
treaty, which gives citizens the possibility to call on the Commission to bring forward 
new policy proposals if at least a million citizens from a number of countries 
participate (European Union 2011).  
 
Additionally in 2001, the European Commission issued a White Paper on European 
governance, reflecting the dual challenge that European leaders are facing: “On the 
one hand, Europeans want them to find solutions to the major problems confronting 
our societies. On the other hand, people increasingly distrust institutions and politics 
or are simply not interested in them” (European Governance 2001, 3). It tackles 
issues of democratic legitimacy, nevertheless stating that the Union is legitimate: 
“The Union is built on the rule of law; it can draw on the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, and it has a double democratic mandate through a Parliament representing 
EU citizens and a Council representing the elected governments of the Member 
States” (European Governance 2001, 7) 
 
Höreth summarizes the Commissions concluding goals to target the Unions 
legitimacy problems. He identifies two main targets of the White Paper’s proposals. 
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The first one is to enhance the democratic character of European policymaking, the 
input dimension, by expanding participation and increasing transparency and 
consultation. The second one is to boost the problem-solving capacity and ability of 
European governance, thereby also increasing the output dimension of Union 
legitimacy (Höreth 2001).  
  
Regarding these institutional developments in the Union an obvious question 
presents itself: why, with all this effort to strengthen democratic legitimacy, have the 
treaties had problems with popular acceptance? 
 
One answer to this could be Hurrelman’s claim, that “[c]ontrary to what is often 
assumed, EU support can still be quite adequately described by the figure of a 
‘permissive consensus’. For better or worse, attempts to democratise EU institutions 
might undermine this form of support” (Hurrelmann 2007, 343). Hurrelmann argues 
that policy areas allocated at EU level possess relative little saliency in the population 
and therefore cannot mobilise European publics. Also, the Eurobarometer shows that 
EU citizens are not especially interested in the Union and its institutions, and posess 
a rather limited knowledge about it. Furthermore, the Eurobarometer data also 
reveals that citizens in both the old as well as the new Member States usually 
express considerable amounts of trust in EU institutions (Hurrelmann 2007).  
 
He states that the permissive consensus is founded in the exact opposite of the 
democratic principles furthered by the Treaties: “not on democratic control but on 
depoliticisation, not on legal certainty but on ambiguity about constitutional principles, 
not on participation but on demobilisation.” (Hurrelmann 2007, 354) 
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Hurrelmann believes this lacking enthusiasm for the Treaties’ efforts to democratize 
Europe is grounded in the equally lacking social preconditions for democracy in the 
EU and the citizens’ prevalent identification with their national democracies. He 
suggests that the loss of partial nation-state competences weighs more than 
European institutions that are suboptimal from a democratic point of view. The EU is 
thus faced with the problem of either continuing its quest to continuously converge 
towards a traditional representative democracy and risk, at least in the short-term, the 
support of the people; or to accept the democratic deficit as a necessary evil.  
 
Whether one accepts this claim of the still existing ‘permissive consensus’ or not, “the 
idea that institutional reforms could significantly improve the democratic quality of the 
Union and, by thus strengthening its normative legitimacy, bolster support for the EU 
institutions – has also been cast into doubt” (Hurrelmann 2007, 343). In combination 
with the spreading disaffection with political parties, distrust in political elites and the 
erosion of civic virtues and capabilities even at the national level, this implies that 
democratic legitimacy in the traditional sense (legitimacy that derives directly from 
involvement and consent of the demos) is growing harder to achieve (Blühdorn 
2009).  
 
 
 e) New Approaches 
 
Although there is a general tendency to accept that little is possible in the way of 
pushing the EU towards becoming a traditional democratic system, new models of 
input legitimacy have been sought by many researchers and practitioners alike. 
Following the Commission’s ‘White Paper on Governance’, the thought that the EU 
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has evolved new modes of governance (NMG) that either compensate for its lack of 
democratic legitimacy, or offer more participatory and deliberative modes of 
democratic politics than the traditional electoral and representative forms of 
democracy observed in nation states, gained popularity (Bellamy & Castiglione 
2011).  
 
In particular, the ‘stakeholder-participation model of input legitimacy’ has been 
advocated, which aims to lessen the legitimacy gap of the EU through encouraging 
participation and deliberation among organized stakeholders around important 
European issues (Lindgren & Person 2010). “This is best understood as a plea to 
give citizens ‘ownership’ of the Union by treating them as the active subjects rather 
than the passive objects of the integration process (Bellamy and Warleigh 1998: cited 
in Lord 2000, 11).  
 
These new modes of governance also mark a renewed influence of liberal 
democratic theory on the Union’s polity; while the republican theory had instructed 
institutional development since Maastricht, liberal democracy resting on the quest for 
a consensus of interests is coming in useful in a time where republican development 
does not seem to be an option.  
 
Still, the confinements of consensual decision-making cannot be significantly relaxed 
as long as there isn’t a collective identity of the peoples of 27 member states that 
could legitimate Europe-wide majority rule (Scharpf 2009) And with the traditional 
forms of competitive party democracy and majority rule proving harder to establish 
and more attenuated at the Union level than in any of the member states (Bellamy 
2010) some scholars of the EU have turned to their focus again; rather than 
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concentrating on ‘traditional’ inputs, their basic normative claim has become to see 
democracy in terms of improved outputs.  
 
 
 f) Output legitimacy 
 
“Traditionally, the powers vested in the EU have been justified primarily by references 
to the output legitimacy it enjoys” (Lindgren & Persson 2010, 451). There is however 
no universally adopted definition of output legitimacy; common to all, is a technocratic 
and utilitarian weak emphasis put on the correctness of the process which generates 
output as long as the output is judged to be correct. What makes output correct or, in 
other words, legitimate, is contested, but two main arguments can be distinguished: 
one referring to the efficiency of output, the other to its representativeness. 
 
The first argues that output is legitimate when it is perceived as efficient (Lindgren & 
Persson 2010) and when it benefits all (Føllesdal 2006). This argument is particularly 
common with critics of the democratic deficit, such as Majone. His view of the EU as 
a regulatory state means that the Union’s activities are about addressing market 
failures and therefore, by definition, are about producing policy outcomes that are 
Pareto-efficient, where some benefit and no one is made worse off (Føllesdal & Hix 
2006) 
 
The second argument sees governance in the Union as ‘government for the people’, 
being “legitimate and even democratic in so far as the output of the political system 
corresponds fully to the collective preferences of its citizens” (Höreth 2001, 6).  
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Some sceptics of the developments bringing the EU closer to traditional democracies 
see these two definitions as being diametrically opposed.  Majone claims that if EU 
policies where made by ‘majoritarian’ institutions, they would cease to be Pareto-
efficient (Føllesdal & Hix 2006), hereby indicating that citizens preferences do not 
concur with Pareto-efficient solutions.  It is the underlying logic of Majone’s argument, 
that increasing input legitimacy may impinge on the Union’s decision-making 
efficiency and thus decrease the crucial output legitimacy (Lindgren & Persson 2010).  
 
This perspective faces harsh criticism. First, Majone might wish that all EU market 
regulatory policies are or should be purely Pareto-efficient but currently the reality 
looks rather different (Føllesdal & Hix 2006). Second, ‘high levels of performance can 
be equated with output legitimacy only if ‘the people’ and not experts define policy 
objectives” (Kohler-Koch & Rittberger 2006, 41). Third, even if it could be 
demonstrated that the Union was a Pareto-improving polity, for policy decisions to be 
neutral there would have to be no multiple equilibria, making it necessary for decision 
makers to choose between a range of Pareto-improving situations on no other 
foundation than their personal preferences (Lord & Beetham 2001). And last, it is 
almost certain that the outcome produced by ‘enlightened technocrats’ would be 
different from those generated in a deliberative democratic process through which 
voters’ preferences are shaped (Føllesdal & Hix 2006).  
 
Not all sceptics of the democratic deficit however assume that citizens’ preferences 
are radically different or less efficient from those of the technocratic decision-makers. 
Moravcsik for example believes that because the governments are in charge of the 
EU and there is ‘hard bargaining’ in the adoption of all EU policies, it  is unlikely for 
the EU to adopt anything which has negative effects on  an important national 
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interest or social group, therefore there is little gap between the preferences of the 
elected governments and final EU policy outcomes and  the EU is not undemocratic 
(Føllesdal & Hix 2006). 
 
Despite the fact, that the nature of the relationship between input and output is 
disputed, and the development of the traditional democratic input mechanisms has 
been forced to come to a halt due to a missing European demos and patchy 
identification with the collective decision making unit (Lord & Beetham 2001) the high 
quality of output in the EU is still assumed by most researchers (e.g. Wiesner 2008; 
Kohler-Koch & Rittberger 2006). Yet the rise of complexity in the EU is bound to also 
have affected the output side of the policy process, possibly impairing the efficiency 
of policy delivery (Blühdorn 2009).  
 
“Eurobarometer data on support for the existence of the European Community and of 
one’s own country membership in it; World Values Survey data showing mistrust of 
other Europeans; reported mistrust of EU institutions; ‘variable implementation’ or 
non-compliance with Union directives; Top Decision-Makers Survey findings of 
disparities between elite and public support for membership; declining voter turnout 
for European Parliament elections; and a lack of parliamentary control of executive 
bodies at the EU level” (Føllesdal 2006, 443) as well as more recently the global 
economic crisis sapping support  for the euro and lowering trust  in the ECB (Jones 
2009) are all indicators, that “legitimacy is not merely a normative issue: it is likely to 
become a political problem” (Føllesdal 2006, 448). In the long-term, compliance and 
support for the EU will only be possible, if both citizens and officials accept the 
legality and normative legitimacy of the regime.  
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As I have stressed repeatedly, further traditional republican democratisation is not an 
option as long as European citizens don’t possess a strong collective identity; 
legitimate output is therefore all the more imperative.  
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III. Testing Output Legitimacy 
 
Surprisingly enough, despite the EU’s historic claim of ‘output legitimacy’ and the 
large body of literature discussing its advantages and limits, there has been little 
systematic research on the empirical condition of the Union’s output.  Casado and 
Lefkofridi (2009) have analyzed the congruence between voters and elites, assuming 
this affects the representativeness of policy output; similarly, Steenbergen et al. 
(2007) have concentrated on the direction of the relationship between elites and 
masses, asking ‘who’s cueing whom’. Alesina et al. (2001) compare citizen 
preferences for the allocation of competences and the actual allocation of 
competences with normative criteria concerning the assignment of policies at 
different government levels, but concentrated on the latter.  To my knowledge, as of 
yet, there has been no extensive empirical analysis of the quality of output – I will 
therefore try to shed some light onto the status of the EU’s most prominent claim: its 
output legitimacy.  
  
Considering the extensive criticism of the idea of ‘output’ being legitimate because of 
its efficiency there really is only one way of testing output legitimacy: one has to 
analyze output for its concurrence with citizen preferences.  
 
To do that, it is first necessary to define what it is, that the EU actually does to create 
output. Very generally speaking the EU is active in the following areas: in the 
negotiation of treaties defining the division of powers and competences between the 
EU and its member states, in the process of enlargement (the expansion of the Union 
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to include new member states), and in drafting legislation in those policy areas where 
at least some competence is allocated at EU level.  
 
Looking at these three different groups of possible output, there is concurrence if the 
division of powers (or in other words the allocation of competences) is modelled 
according to the wishes of the European public, if the process of enlargement 
continues or halts with the preferences of the EU’s citizens, and if the content 
implemented in traditional areas to some degree reflects the opinion of a majority of 
Europeans.  
 
As an analysis of concurrence between output and citizen preferences needs 
substantial data on the latter, I will concentrate on the allocation of competences, on 
which the Eurobarometer has been collecting citizen preferences since the late 
1980s. Cerniglia and Pagani (2007) have analyzed this data in detail and I will draw 
upon their work strongly in the following assessment of output legitimacy. Concerning 
the actual allocation of competences in the EU, I will use indicators that Alesina et al 
(2001) constructed when trying to find out what it is that the EU actually does, which 
measure the actual involvement of the EU in different policy areas. This is not an 
exhaustive account of output legitimacy but rather the analysis of one small 
contributing factor of output legitimacy;  in the following, when I will use the term 
‘allocation legitimacy’, I am referring only to the legitimacy of the European Union 
derived from the allocation of competences according to citizen preferences.  
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 a) Hypotheses 
 
Assuming that output and input legitimacy are mutually reinforcing (Eriksen and 
Fossum 2000; Verweij and Josling 2003; Zürn 2000) and considering the flawed 
input mechanisms of the EU as well as the “uncontrolled centralization of 
competences” (Knoll & Koenig 2010, 2) I suppose that the output (allocation of 
competences) of the European Union does not concur with the preferences of EU 
citizens. I also assume that the concurrence with citizen preferences will differ 
between the various channels (legal, judiciary and other non-binding acts) through 
which policy can be shaped, suggesting that some EU institutions are more 
responsive than others.  
 
 b) Methods and Data 
 
“From the outset, European integration was about the transfer of powers from the 
national to the European level, which evolved as explicit bargaining among 
governments or as an incremental drift” (Benz & Zimmer 2010, 5). Basic assumptions 
of intergoverntmentalism and neo-functionalism have proved a starting point for an 
abundance of theories and explanations for the delegation of national sovereignty to 
supranational institutions. Certain theories of European Integration have proved more 
valid for certain policy areas, institutional settings, and certain times, but there is still 
no single most convincing concept that is generally apliccable (Benz & Zimmer 2010) 
 
One predicament of integration literature therefore remains the lack of a common 
concept of the meaning and an agreement on the measurement of EU powers.  
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The Treaties alone do not suffice to provide a method for assigning policy 
prerogatives among supranational, national and local policy authorities in the 
continent (Alesina et al. 2001) as “in a situation where contracts are incomplete and 
actors are competence maximizers, institutional development will occur not only at 
the initial moment of institutional choice, but in ex post bargaining among actors over 
how ambiguities in institution should be interpreted.” (Farell & Héritier 2007, 3) 
 
“In any case, the concept of multi-level governance strongly challenges the 
assumption that any kind of vertical allocation of competences between levels can 
determine policy-making” (Benz & Zimmer 2010, 18).  The problem is that every 
attempt to clearly divide competences in a multi-level system turns the allocation of 
competences into a zero-sum game in which there can only be winners or losers 
(Hurrelmann 2007). 
 
To tackle this problem, Alesina et al. (2001) have constructed a set of indicators to 
measure the policy-making role of the EU in a selected number of policy domains.  
 
 Allocation of Competences in the European Union 
 
Using the available information, provided mainly through EU on-line services, Alesina 
et al. (2001) derive simple quantitative measures of the EU involvement across policy 
areas. They accomplish this using a very simple method: they count the number of 
legal, judiciary, and other non-binding acts (“policy acts”) put forth by the EU, 
classified across policy fields, and assembling the results from various sources into 
summary indicators. Their approach has advantages and drawbacks. The key 
advantages of simple counting are transparency and objectivity. The disadvantage is 
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that individual policy acts can be more or less influential. If these differences are 
randomly distributed across policy chapters, however, one can rely on the law of 
large numbers to lessen the problem (the available sample sizes are indeed very 
large).  
 
Alesina et al. distinguish nine broadly homogeneous policy domains - I however will 
only refer to the following six, when comparing the EU involvement in each to citizen 
preferences on the allocation of competences: 
 
1. Money and Finance   
  This area includes monetary and exchanges rate policy, payments systems 
 and financial market regulation and legislation, bank  supervision, fiscal and 
 tax policies, etc. 
 
2. Education, Research and Culture 
 This policy domain includes youth policies, research, technology, preservation 
 of the cultural heritage, etc.  
 
3. Environment 
 This domain includes all measures taken to protect and attend to the 
 environment. 
 
4. Business Relations (sectoral) 
 This includes all policies designed to affect the behaviour and performance of 
 the economic producing sectors. Alesina et al. break this domain into three 
 sub-areas: Agriculture, Industry and Transport – I will only regard agriculture. 
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5. International Relations and Foreign Aid 
 This includes foreign policy, defence, and foreign aid. 
 
6. Citizens and Social Protection 
 This includes home affairs, justice, consumer protection, civil rights, health, 
 labor relations, etc.  
 
Alesina et al. give a short overview over the different kind of instruments and 
processes that are used by the EU to formulate and to enact its policies and that 
they included in their count. These are interesting as EU involvement often differs 
strongly across the various instruments and I will analyze if the degree of 
involvement of some instruments is more likely to concur with citizen preferences 
than that of  others.  
 
1. The Treaties  
 The primary source of law and policy-making power in the EU are the Treaties. 
 Treaties are composed at ‘Intergovernmental Conferences’ and have to be 
 ratified by all member governments. Treaties, their annexes and Protocols 
 constitute the ultimate source of authorization and legitimacy for EU 
 institutions and their legislative and judicial control. There have been, 
 however, important initiatives that have arisen in the EU context, that do not 
 originate form or are mentioned in the Treaties. Important policy chapters often 
 have only a very general foundation in the Treaties (e.g., transport). In other 
 cases, explicit Treaty provisions remain ineffectual for a long time until the 
 conditions for concrete action appear. But there are also cases, in which the 
 36
 letter of the Treaty has a direct and undelayed effect – the goal of price 
 stability, for example, has become a key element of the ECB’s monetary policy 
 (Alesina et al. 2001).  
 
 
2. Secondary Legislation and non-binding acts 
 Secondary legislation includes a range of different binding and non-binding 
 legal instruments. Three categories of secondary legislation can be 
 distinguished: 
 Regulations, which are fully binding towards all parties, are directly applicable 
 and don’t need national application. Directives are binding towards all member 
 states addressed and contain specific results that are to be achieved but leave 
 the member states the choice of how to best implement them.  Decisions are 
 binding for all parties (not exclusively member states) addressed and vary in 
 degree of specification. 
In addition, the EU Commission issues a number of “softer” acts, or 
 documents, of non-binding nature, such as White papers, that outline the 
goals of future legislative activity. 
 
3. Enforcement via the Court of Justice 
 The ECJ has a double role of interpreting EU law and ensuring its application 
 and enforcement. Governments as well as private agents and staff of the EU 
 agencies can initiate a court case. Judicial rulings do not have legal status, but 
 the Court has significant power to give content to existing laws and making 
 them effective. Like European law overrules national laws, ECB decisions 
 overrule national court decisions.  
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4. International Agreements 
 The EU negotiates three kinds of international agreements: trade agreements, 
 trade and cooperation agreements and association agreements. These 
 agreements vary in their limitation to trade.  
 
5. The ECB 
 In comparison to other policy areas the competences of the ECB are very well 
 documented in the Treaties and monetary policy-making is conducted in a 
 distinct way, as the ECB is independent of other EU bodies and national 
 Parliaments.  
 
Alesina et al. assemble all the empirical evidence into summary indicators in order 
get a better understanding of how active the EU is in the different policy domains.  
One can assume that the more active the EU is in a certain policy area, the stronger 
it’s actual competences in this domain are. For better understanding, I will reproduce 
a part of their explanation here: 
To construct these summary indicators they proceed in two steps: 
(Table10: Alesina et al. 2001) 
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First, they compile semi-aggregate indicators of policy involvement (broken down by 
domains) for each of the three main channels of policy making, i.e., the Treaties, the 
secondary legislation and the Court. Second, they combine these into overall 
indicators of policy involvement, using specific aggregation criteria, which can be 
retraced in the statistical annex at the end of this thesis.  
 
The first index assumes that the EU policy services (the “output”) are provided with a 
production technology that is linear in the three “inputs,” i1 (the Treaties), i2 
(secondary legislation) and i3 (Court activity). The second index uses the same 
technology for the first two inputs, while the first two and the third are aggregated 
using a Cobb Douglas technology. In the latter, the elasticity of substitution is 
constant and unitary, which implies that the rate of substitution between (i1 + i2)/2 
and i3 decreases as the use of i3 increases. This expresses the idea that the pair of 
inputs (i1 + i2)/2 and i3 are to some extent complementary. In the third index, we 
push this idea further by assuming that the production technology is of Leontief type: 
there is no substitution at all between (i1 + i2)/2 and i3 and the “output” is determined 
by the most scarce “input”. Finally, they also calculate a rank indicator, equal to the 
mean of the ranks of i1, i2 and i3. The summary indicators provide a measure of the 
relative degree of involvement of the EU in the policy areas.  
 
 
 Citizen Preferences towards the Allocation of Competences in the European 
 Union 
 
In their study, Cerniglia and Pagani use data on citizen preferences, collected in the 
Eurobarometer. The Eurobarometer is a public opinion survey conducted on behalf of 
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the EU commission conducted between two and five times a year. Each survey 
consists in approximately 1000 face-to-face interviews per Member State (except 
Germany: 1500, Luxembourg: 600, United Kingdom 1300 including 300 in Northern 
Ireland).  Respondents are citizens aged 15 and over residing in EU15. An identical 
set of questions is asked in each Eurobarometer, thus the questions are repeated 
over time.  
 
Cerniglia and Pagani built a single data set joining 13 surveys in a pooled cross-
section data set, consisting of 209,469 observations. These surveys are numbers 
43.1 (which refers to 1995), 48 (1997), 49 and 50 (1998), 51 and 52 (1999), 53 and 
54.1 (2000), 56.2 (2001), 57.1 and 58.1 (2002), 59.1 and 60 (2003). 
In each survey, for different policy areas EU citizens are asked whether they think 
that the corresponding policy decisions should be taken by own country government 
or jointly within the European Union. The exact wording of the question in the survey 
is:  
“Some people believe that certain areas of policy should be decided by the 
(NATIONAL) government, while other areas of policy should be decided jointly within 
the European Union. Which of the following areas of policy do you think should be 
decided by the (NATIONAL) government, and which should be decided jointly within 
the European Union?”  
 
Although the exact meaning of ‘jointly’ is unclear, Cerniglia and Pagani interpret this 
answer as the willingness to transfer the concerned policy to the EU level. Other than 
that, they believe the question to give a useful overview of how European citizens 
wish the allocation of powers between the EU and member States to look like.  
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The policy areas over which the respondents are asked to express themselves 
change from survey to survey. There are 16 areas present in all the 13 considered 
surveys, 18 areas present since survey 50, 25 since survey 52, 26 since survey 56.2 
and 27 since survey 57.121. 
 
Cerniglia and Pagani also include an econometric analysis, using demographic and 
other background information available in the data set.  I however will not use the 
findings of this analysis, as it doesn’t have any explanatory value concerning the 
concurrence of citizen preferences and the allocation of competences.  
 
To describe the preferences of European citizens regarding the allocation of 
competences, Cerniglia and Pagani form the integer of the balance of answers to the 
question relative to the preferred allocation of competences (PA), calculated with the 
following formula: PA=[(EU-N)(1- DK/100)], where EU represents the percentage of 
people stating that the corresponding area of policy should be decided jointly within 
the European Union, N the percentage of people stating that the corresponding area 
of policy should be decided by the national government, and DK the percentage of 
people who don’t know to whom the competence should be assigned. The larger the 
integer, the higher the (percent) number of people that have expressed a preference 
for a jointly (or shared) responsibility, weighted for the undecided. The values range 
from –100 to +100; a value of +100 (-100) means a unanimous preference for shared 
(national) competence. As Cerniglia and Pagani have only calculated the integers for 
citizens of the different member states and not for the citizens of the EU, I have 
calculated them myself. The European Union is in the difficult situation of having to 
please the majority of citizens of its member states as well as the general majority of 
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EU citizens. This data and that of Cerniglia and Pagani can be found in the statistical 
annex at the end of the thesis. 
 
In the following chapter I will combine the findings of Alesina et al. with those of 
Cerniglia and Pagani in a descriptive analysis, in order to shed light on the 
representation of citizen preferences in the allocation of competences in the EU.  
 
 
 d) Empirical Comparison of Citizen Preferences and the Allocation of 
 Competences 
 
In this empirical comparison of citizen preferences towards the allocation of 
competences between the national and the EU level and the actual allocation of 
these competences, I will proceed as follows: 
I will first tackle each one of the six policy domains that I adopted from Alesina et al. 
(2001), describing the level and character of EU-involvement and then contrast this 
with the preferences of the Eurobarometer respondents, to find out if allocation and 
preferences concur. Also I will pay attention to such details as the equal 
representation of member states and the relation between the number of states for 
the allocation on one level and the percentage of EU citizens.  
 
One concern in this comparison could be the different time-frames the Alesina et al. 
and Cerniglia and Pagani used for their analysis. This however does not distort my 
findings for two reasons: First of all, the preferences towards the allocation of 
competences have been remarkably stable in the years included in Cerniglia and 
Pagani’s study (1995-2003). And second of all, the 
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necessarily to respond to citizen preferences, but to concur with them – this can also 
mean that output is convincing ex post and citizen preferences follow its lead.  
 
 Money and Finance 
 
  
Treaty 
Articles 
Treaty 
Words Regulations Directives Decisions 
Court 
Judgments  
Court 
Opinions 
18 4335 138 77 138 105 123 
 
Alesina et al. indicators show that the degree of EU involvement in the policy domain 
of money and finance was neither especially high, nor especially low until 2000. 
Policy making concerning monetary and exchanges rate policy, payments systems 
and financial market regulation and legislation, bank  supervision, fiscal and tax 
policies and other related issues, happened mainly through primary legislation in the 
Treaties and court decisions – secondary legislation played an almost negligible role.   
 
It was mentioned in 18 Treaty Articles and ranks fifth in the listing of Treaty-words per 
policy domain; there were 58 regulations, 77 directives and 138 decisions concerning 
money and finance in force at the time, making it second to last in the ranking of 
legislation intensity across policy domains. The court issued a total of 105 
judgements and 123 Opinions on financial and money related issues. Other 
measures of policy intensity, such as international agreements, recommendations 
and opinions, staff size, etc. are relatively low for money and finance – solely two 
White Papers dedicated to this policy domain stand out.   
 
“The existence of a single European currency requires a significant area-wide 
centralization of this policy domain not only in the strict field of monetary policy, but 
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also in related areas such as payments systems, money market infrastructures, etc. 
Financial market integration is gradually but powerfully pushing towards increasing 
area-wide co-ordination of supervisory practices and financial market policies. In the 
areas of budget policies and taxation, the two current issues regard budget co-
ordination (beyond the Stability and Growth Pact) and tax harmonization” (Alesina et 
al. 2001, 20).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the Eurobarometer data presented, there is only one question that falls into this 
policy domain and it concerns ‘currency’. The majority of European citizens has 
answered this question in favour of joint competences at EU level since 1995. The 
only member state whose citizens have opposed EU involvement in currency matters 
without disruption is the UK. Other countries that have opposed joint competences in 
currency matters are Finland, Denmark, Sweden and Austria. 
  
  
Education, Research and Culture 
 
Education, research, culture 
Treaty 
Articles 
Treaty 
Words Regulations Directives Decisions 
Court 
Judgments  
Court 
Opinions 
14 1614 22 19 94 1 0 
 
Currency 
1995 27,55 
1997 14,88 
1998 37,05 
1999 22,8 
2000 21,85 
2001 32,64 
2003 26,7 
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The EU involvement in Education, research and culture appears limited. The Treaties 
place a considerable emphasis on these issues, but the effect is weakened in the 
overall indexes by the lack of legislative and Court activity. Fourteen articles in the 
Treaties are devoted to matters of this policy domain, but only 22 Regulations, 19 
Directives, 94 Decisions and one Court decision target it, ranking it last in both the list 
of legislative and the list of judicative intensity across EU policy domains. The EU 
does however devote a considerable amount of financial and staff resources to these 
issues and five Green Papers and one White paper concerning them have been 
published. 
 
Culture 
1995 -26% 
1997 -21% 
1998 -19% 
1999 -13% 
2000 -19% 
2001 -5% 
2003 -9% 
 
The Eurobarometer data offer three requested allocation preferences that perfectly 
match the name of this policy domain; for education, for research and for culture. 
Concerning education EU citizens have been consistently against competences at 
EU level, with the Greeks and the Italians being the exception to the rule, repeatedly 
responding preferably for joint competences and Luxembourg responding preferably 
in 1995.  
By contrast, research is one of two policy issues that has been allocated to EU level 
by citizen preferences from 1998 to 2003 without exception and with rather 
homogenous and strong values across all member states.   
Education 
1995 -38% 
1997 -29% 
1998 -25% 
1999 -28% 
2000 -29% 
2001 -26% 
2003 -33% 
Research 
 1995 45% 
1997 41% 
1998 46% 
1999 36% 
2000 36% 
2001 41% 
2003 38% 
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Culture has been allocated to the national level from the first survey included in this 
study to the last, but decreasingly so. Italians are the only nationality that wished for 
an allocation at EU level from the beginning to the end, in some years joined by other 
southern countries such as Spain, Portugal and Greece.  
 
 Environment 
 
Environment 
Treaty 
Articles 
Treaty 
Words Regulations Directives Decisions 
Court 
Judgments  
Court 
Opinions 
3 682 66 193 188 70 59 
 
According to the data, the EU involvement in Environment is very limited in Treaties 
as well as secondary legislation and court rulings.  Only three Articles in the Treaties 
target environmental issues, making it the least mentioned policy domain in the 
Treaties; also, judging from the EU treaties, the mandate of the EU is rather general. 
 There are 66 Environment-related regulations, 193 directives and 188 decisions, 70 
court judgements and 59 court opinions. In other measures of policy intensity 
Environmental issues score relatively low as well, although 9 published Green 
Papers do stand out – only common market, citizen and social protection and non-
sectoral business issues have are targeted in as many or more Green Papers.  
 
Environment 
1995 32,01 
1997 30,72 
1998 31,68 
1999 20,16 
2000 19,2 
2001 30,07 
2003 26,7 
 
 46
European citizens have continuously had a quite strong preference to place 
environmental policy issues at the Union level in all surveys, tendency increasing 
both when looking at the EU population as a whole and when looking at the different 
nationalities. The only recurring exceptions are Finland, Sweden, Austria and the UK; 
in 1999 the Irish and the Danish were also opposed to joint competences in 
environmental matters.  
 
Business Relations (Sectoral) 
 
Agriculture and fishery 
Treaty 
Articles 
Treaty 
Words Regulations Directives Decisions 
Court 
Judgments  
Court 
Opinions 
7 1072 3733 484 2245 214 106 
 
Industry and energy 
Treaty 
Articles 
Treaty 
Words Regulations Directives Decisions 
Court 
Judgments  
Court 
Opinions 
1 15228 70 45 380 2 0 
 
Transport 
Treaty 
Articles 
Treaty 
Words Regulations Directives Decisions 
Court 
Judgments  
Court 
Opinions 
11 983 112 121 113 32 24 
 
Sectoral business relations take up the largest share of EU policy-action in the group 
of policy domains developed by Alesina et al., mainly due to the vast amount of 
legislation on agricultural issues. Over 40 percent of the EU secondary legislation 
that was in force in 2000 concerns agriculture although in the policy intensity 
measured by Treaties it ranks second to last. The court plays a relatively large role in 
agricultural policy concerns, having issued 214 judgments and 106 opinions  
Agriculture also claims the largest share of EU financial resources and a significant 
portion of international agreements and non-binding legislation.  
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Industry and Energy score exceptionally high on Treaty involvement when looking at 
the number of words devoted to it, which is easily explained by the Steel and Coal 
and the Euroatom Treaties – with  70 regulations, 45 directives, 380 decisions and 
only two court judgements however, the actual EU involvement in industrial policy-
making is rather small.  
The same applies to Transport – although 11 Treaty Articles are concerned with 
Transport issues, with only 346 binding legislative acts and 56 court rulings the actual 
intensity of EU-policy-making in this field is very low.  
Industry and Energy, as well as Transport are strongly targeted by non-binding 
legislation.  
Agriculture 
1995 11% 
1997 9,99% 
1998 9,99% 
1999 4,00% 
2000 -1,00% 
2001 3,00% 
2003 7,59% 
 
The Eurobarometer data offers no data on industry, energy and fishery but it does 
include a question concerning the allocation of agriculture.  Looking at the overall EU 
population, EU citizens show a weak preference for allocation at the Union level, 
however in 2000, this preference reversed. 2000, as well as 1999, were also the only 
two years, where the majority of nationalities where opposed to joint competencies in 
agricultural matters. The UK, Finland, Sweden and Austria are the strongest 
opponents of this allocation and have wanted agriculture to be allocated at the 
national level in every survey; Denmark, Portugal, Spain and Greece have also 
repeatedly opposed joint allocation; Ireland opposed joint allocation only in 1999. 
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International Relations and Foreign Aid 
 
International relations and foreign aid 
Treaty 
Articles 
Treaty 
Words Regulations Directives Decisions 
Court 
Judgments  
Court 
Opinions 
25 3494 222 1 258 44 28 
 
The degree of EU-level involvement in the area of International relations is rather 
limited, according to the summary data. Although it has a quite high standing in the 
Treaties, secondary legislation and court rulings are very scarce.  
Seven Treaty articles concern international relations and foreign aid. Binding 
legislative acts in this policy field are relatively few; there are 222 regulations, one 
directive and 258 decisions. The court issued 44 judgements and 28 opinions. 
Considering other measures of policy intensity, the number of international 
agreements concerning international relations and foreign aid is not nearly as high as 
that of international trade or sectoral business relations, but it is significantly higher 
than that of all other policy domains. Also, there was one white paper published 
targeting issues of international relations and foreign aid.  
 
In the data on allocation preferences, there are three questions that fall into the policy 
domain of international relations and foreign aid: defence, foreign policy and 
humanitarian aid.  
 
Humanitarian Aid 
1995   
1997   
1998 44,98% 
1999 38,98% 
2000 38,98% 
2001 47,98% 
2003 42,98% 
Defense 
1995 6,72 
1997 5,64 
1998 5,64 
1999 1,9 
2000 2,85 
2001 5,76 
2003 4,47 
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The majority of citizens have wanted defence issues allocated at the EU level in all 
surveys. Here the differences between national preferences are especially high – 
while Finns, Swedes, British, Danes and Austrians particularly don’t want any 
competences in defence located at the EU level, the Germans, the Italians, the 
Spanish, the Belgians, the Dutch and the Irish are for defence being allocated at the 
Union level.  
 
Concerning foreign policy, a strong majority of EU citizens continuously responded in 
favour of competences allocated at the EU level from 1998 to 2003 and not one of 
the single nationalities ever voted against it in these surveys.  
 
Humanitarian aid is a similar case – only the Finns, the Swedes and the Austrians  
ever rejected humanitarian aid being allocated jointly at the Union level. A significant 
majority of EU citizens would have preferred it to be allocated there throughout all 
surveys. In 2001 and 2002 not only the majority of EU citizens, but also all 
nationalities included in the survey preferred joint allocation. 
 Citizens and Social Protection 
 
Citizens and social protection 
Treaty 
Articles 
Treaty 
Words Regulations Directives Decisions 
Court 
Judgments  
Court 
Opinions 
46 6647 257 178 527 123 85 
 
Foreign Policy 
1995 47,96% 
1997 45,95% 
1998 49,96% 
1999 46,96% 
2000 45,96% 
2001 48,97% 
2003 52,46% 
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The degree of EU involvement in citizen and social protection issues is “surprisingly 
strong, due to extensive Treaty provisions but also to a significant support of 
secondary legislation and particularly the Court of Justice. The latest Treaties have 
strengthened the base for EU social policies to include “human resource, social 
protection and social inclusion” (Maastricht) and employment promotion (Alesina et 
al. 2001, 20).  
Issues concerning citizens and social protection are included in 46 Treaty articles, 
more than any other policy domain analyzed by Alesina et al. Yet it only ranks fifth 
and sixth in the listing of EU policy-intensity through legislation or the court.  There is 
however a significant number of non-binding legislation devoted to citizen protection 
and social protection as well as the third largest share of EU expenditure. 
 
Twelve questions included in the Eurobarometer data fall into this policy domain: 
health and social welfare, unemployment, immigration, political asylum, drugs, 
poverty, crime, police, justice, accepting refugees and juvenile and urban crime 
prevention.  
 
Health & SW 
1995 -22,08 
1997 -27,55 
1998 -25,92 
1999 -26,88 
2000 -27,84 
2001 -13,2 
2003 -36,49 
 
Health and Social Welfare are quite strongly located at national level in overall EU 
citizen preferences. Only two nationalities, the Greek and the Italians, repeatedly 
responded favourably to these competences being transferred to Union level. The 
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Portuguese and the people of Luxembourg responded favourably only in 1995. The 
greatest opponents of health and social welfare issues being jointly handled are the 
Scandinavian countries.  
 
Unemployment 
1995 17,99% 
1997 13,99% 
1998 15,99% 
1999 8,00% 
2000 12,00% 
2001 10,00% 
2003 -9,10% 
 
Unemployment is quite a different case; the majority of respondents as well as the 
majority of nationlaties have pronounced the preferences for unemployment policies 
to be placed at the European level in all surveys but the last. While a lot of the higher 
populated member states’ citizens prefer a European handling of the issue, citizens 
of smaller states such as Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Luxembourg and the 
Netherland, but also of the highly populated United Kingdom, prefer keeping these 
policies at the national level.  Portuguese and Austrians have preferred 
unemployment to be handled nationally repeatedly; the Belgians, the Germans and 
the French preferred national responsibility for unemployment policy only in 2003. 
 
Imigration 
1995 19,99% 
1997 13,99% 
1998 19,99% 
1999 3,00% 
2000 -3,00% 
2001 0,00% 
2003 6,80% 
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Immigration is a split case; when looking at the EU population as a whole, citizen 
preferences allocate immigration policy at the Union level in all but two years the 
included in the anlysis, but when examining the different member states there are 
considerable differences; the majority of nationalities only allocated immigration 
policy at Union level in four of the eight years included. While the citizens of Belgium, 
Spain, France and the Netherlands have continuously favoured EU policy making, 
citizens of  Denmark, the UK, Finland, Sweden and Austria in this case clearly prefer 
national policy-making.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
European citizen preferences concerning matters of political asylum have constantly 
allocated policy competences on the EU level, except in 2000. The majority of 
nationalities however only allocated policy competence in this policy field on EU level 
in four of the eight years included in the analysis. The citizens of Denmark, the UK, 
Finland, Sweden and Austria have consistently opposed joint allocation, while the 
citizens of Italy Spain and France have consistently supported it.  
 
 
Political Asylium 
1995 17,99% 
1997 14,99% 
1998 17,99% 
1999 8,00% 
2000 -2,00% 
2001 6,00% 
2003 11,79% 
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Preferences on the allocation of competences in accepting refugees are very similar 
to those in political asylum. The majority of European citizens prefers an allocation on 
EU level, while the majority of nationalities only does so in 1999 and 2003. Here also 
the citizens of Spain, Italy and France that continuously and strongly prefer joint 
competences while citizens of Denmark, the UK, Finland, Sweden and Austria 
oppose joint competences.  
 
Drugs 
1995 57,98% 
1997 45,98% 
1998 47,98% 
1999 38,98% 
2000 35,99% 
2001 44,99% 
2003 38,59% 
 
Drug-issues are such, that the European people agree – all nationalities in all 
selected surveys highly favour the handling of drug-related policy on the Union level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Accepting Refugees 
1995   
1997   
1998   
1999 10,99% 
2000 1,00% 
2001 9,60% 
2003 9,70% 
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Also for poverty and crime the respondents answers where rather homogenously for 
the tackling the issue at Union level. European citizen preferences concerning 
policies targeting poverty continuously located competences at the EU level – only in 
1999 citizens of Denmark and Sweden disagreed and in 2003 citizens of Finland 
disagreed. Concerning crime, the majority of European citizens as well as 
nationalities prefer policy competences to be allocated at the Union level – only  in 
1999 and in 2002 citizens of the UK opposed allocation of  competences on this 
level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Police and justice on the other hand are quite uniformly preferred on the national 
level. In police matters, European citizens as well as all the nationalities prefer 
allocation at the national level in all years included in the analysis. In judicial affairs, 
only citizens of Italy, the Netherlands, Greece and Spain have preferred allocation of 
Poverty 
1995   
1997   
1998 34,98% 
1999 26,99% 
2000 29,99% 
2001 35,99% 
2003 17,09% 
Crime 
1995   
1997   
1998   
1999 37,98% 
2000 33,99% 
2001 46,99% 
2003 45,48% 
Justice 
1995   
1997   
1998   
1999 -19,99% 
2000 -23,99% 
2001 -19,99% 
2003 -33,29% 
Police 
1995   
1997   
1998   
1999 -29,99% 
2000 -31,99% 
2001 -28,99% 
2003 -42,69% 
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competences at the Union level in some years. In 2003, the last year included in the 
analysis, all nationalities prefer allocation at the national level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Juvenile and urban crime prevention are both considered better located at the nation 
level by the majority of EU-citizens as well as by the different member state 
nationalities. 
 
 
e) Assessment  
 
This analysis, although only descriptive, clearly points out a few interesting things. 
First of all, it calls into question the claim of intact output legitimacy (in this particular 
case allocation legitimacy) in the EU: 
 
In the policy domain of Money and Finance EU citizens are for joint competences 
between the member states and the EU and the Union is, although not as strongly 
involved as in other cases, relatively active according to the data presented by 
Alesina et al.  In currency matters at least, European citizens’ preferences concur 
with this allocation of competences – allocation legitimacy can therefore be assumed.  
 
Juvenile Crime Prevention 
1995   
1997   
1998   
1999 -7,00% 
2000 -10,00% 
2001 -6,00% 
2003 -20,79% 
Urban Crime Prevention 
1995   
1997   
1998   
1999 -18,99% 
2000 -18,99% 
2001 -15,99% 
2003 -29,59% 
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The EU’s involvement in Education, Research and Culture is very limited. This 
concurs with citizens preferences on Education and Culture, but not on Research. 
Unfortunately this can only give us a rough idea of allocation legitimacy, as to draw a 
meaningful conclusion on the concurrence of competence allocation and citizen 
preferences from this data, it would be necessary to know the separate degrees of 
involvement in Education, Research and Culture each – not the collective 
involvement in all three areas.  
 
Environment on the other hand is a very clear case: EU involvement is very limited, 
(only the court plays a relatively strong role in comparison with other policy areas) 
while citizens have stated a strong and consistent preference for an allocation of 
competences at the Union level.  There is therefore little allocation legitimacy here.  
 
Concerning agricultural issues, citizens have shown only a weak preference for 
Union handling of the matter while the actual involvement of the Union is very strong. 
In no other policy domain have there been as many secondary legislative acts as in 
agriculture, and the court was only more active in two other policy domains. The 
competence is therefore allocated at the right level, but the degree of involvement 
questionable.  
 
Another clear case is the policy domain of International Relations and Foreign Aid: 
citizen preferences are distinctly for an allocation of this policy domain at the EU 
level. Actual involvement of the Union is however rather low – only the treaties attend 
to this policy domain with relative thoroughness.  This discrepancy between citizen 
preferences and EU action implies a lack of allocation legitimacy.  
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Citizen and Social Protection issues make for a complex case: of the 12 
Eurobarometer questions included in the article, citizen are clearly for handling on the 
EU level in 6 cases (unemployment, political asylum, accepting refugees, drugs, 
poverty and crime) and clearly for handling at the national level in six other cases 
(Health and social welfare, urban crime prevention, juvenile crime prevention, police 
and justice), while one case stays unclear: in immigration matters the majority of EU 
citizens prefers allocation of competences at the EU level but the majority of 
nationalities prefers allocation of competences at the national level.  
Actual EU involvement in these areas is relatively strong in all main channels of 
policy formation (Treaties, legislation and court judgments) as well as in non-binding 
legislative acts and expenditure. As we cannot detect a general tendency of citizen 
preferences in this policy domain and Alesina et al. do not offer any information on 
the exact causes of the strong EU involvement but only the general involvement in all 
questions concerning citizen and social protection, unfortunately it is impossible to 
assess allocation legitimacy here.  
 
 
In the six different areas I have analyzed in this comparison of citizen preferences 
towards competence allocation and the actual allocation in the EU there were two 
policy domains in which preferences an allocation concurred, two policy domains in 
which they differed  and two in which it is not possible to make a valid judgement.  
In the cases included in this examination therefore citizen preferences concur with 
the allocation of competences as often as they do not.  
This definitely points out a scope for improvement in allocation legitimacy. This dose 
not prove my first hypotheses, but it does not disprove it either – a lot of research can  
still be done, to get a more detailed and accurate picture of allocation legitimacy. 
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Secondly, I could not detect any pattern in the degree of involvement of the different 
policy channels. To completely discard this hypotheses however, also more research 
is necessary.  
 
A few other things became apparent throughout my analysis:  
One was the realization, that even if the majority of nationalities prefer one thing, the 
majority of EU citizens might prefer something else – this was the case for the policy 
domains of agriculture and immigration in some years. High allocation legitimacy can 
only be reached, if not only either the majority of EU citizens or the majority of 
nationalities concur with the allocation of competences, but if all three concur.   
Also, the differences between the preferences of citizens of different member states 
can be very large; here also immigration is a good example, where the Finns, the 
Swedes and the Austrians are strongly opposed to the allocation of competences at 
the EU level and the Greek, the Italians and the Spanish are strongly in favour of 
allocation of competences at the EU level.  
 
What impact do my findings on the allocation legitimacy have on the theoretical body 
of literature on the legitimacy of the Union? At the moment researchers are at a loss 
when confronted with the democratic deficit of the EU – there is no way of disposing 
of it, as the social preconditions necessary for a fully grown traditional democracy just 
aren’t available currently and therefore any further action in that direction would only 
endanger the democratic legitimacy of the member states. On the other hand, the 
original and historic basis of the Union’s legitimacy, it’s efficiency in producing 
convincing policy outputs is starting to be questioned as well – my thesis supports 
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this doubt of the Union’s claim of output legitimacy.  But as I stated at the very 
beginning of this thesis, the concept of legitimacy is about the social acceptability of a 
political order (or any other order that pools power resources); as long as EU 
member state and citizens still comply with EU law, without having to be sanctioned, 
there is indirect legitimacy through the national governments and partial republican 
legitimacy through the EU institutions, the Union can never be wholly illegitimate.  
 
But the partial discrepancy between EU-output and citizen preferences that I have 
detected should open our eyes to the severity of the need for new modes of 
government, that manage to include the preference of the union’s citizens into the 
policymaking process.  
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VII. Conclusion 
 
In this thesis I have examined the EU’s claim of output legitimacy theoretically and 
empirically. I will summarize shortly: 
 
I first reviewed the most important developments in European legitimacy theories, 
that have lately led to a recurring turn towards the quality of output as a source of 
legitimacy for the EU.  
 
While at the beginning of EU legitimacy research, the quality of EU output was not 
questioned, after ratification problems with the Treaty of Maastricht, legitimacy 
students started concentrating on the lack of input mechanisms, that may have 
caused these difficulties. Parallel to this research, the input mechanisms of the EU 
have been strengthened continuously up until the latest Treaty, the Treaty of Lisbon. 
Still the legitimacy of the EU was questioned – but now, the bolstering of input 
mechanisms was no longer a viable choice, as the confinements of consensual 
decision-making cannot be relaxed any more as long as there isn’t a collective 
identity of the peoples of 27 member states that could legitimate Europe-wide 
majority – therefore scholars have returned to theories of output legitimacy, searching 
for ways of generating or increasing it, generally assuming however that it is quite 
intact.   
 
This is the assumption that triggered my empirical interest – is the output legitimacy 
of the EU really intact? In my theoretical section, I explained that output is legitimate 
if it concurs with citizen preferences. My objective therefore was to find out if EU 
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output concurs with citizen preferences. I concentrated only on one small aspect of 
EU output: the allocation of competences.  
 
My analysis shows, that  the allocation of competences in the EU concurs with citizen 
preferences as often as it does not. This means that there is a definite capacity for 
EU output in the case of the allocation of competences to improve.  
 
More research is definitely called for; knowledge about what output, generated 
through which channels does not concur with whose preferences could instruct future 
new models of input mechanisms, which are urgently needed to secure responsive 
representation of the wants and needs of European citizens and my analysis is 
incomplete in many ways.  
First of all, the measure of EU-involvement in the various policy domains only 
approximately equates to the actual allocation of competences between the national 
and the Union level. Second, more detailed data on citizen preferences, not only on 
the allocation of competences but also regarding political content of the different 
policy areas, as well as a detailed and broken down account of the action taken  by 
the EU in each of these areas would allow a more extended analysis of citizen 
preference and output concurrence.  
Also my analysis was confounded by the data to a time period that ends in 2003 – 
since then, the member states have ratified a new treaty that has introduced a 
number of changes to the allocation of competences, as well as other output factors 
in the EU.  
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Nevertheless, output legitimacy, even though highly contested as a sole source of 
legitimacy for EU policy-making, has barely ever been questioned – there seems to 
be an unconscious agreement, that what the EU is doing is right, it’s just a matter of 
how it’s done. My descriptive analysis of the concurrence of citizen preferences with 
the allocation of competences in the EU does demonstrates that this might not be 
true.  
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Statistical Annex 
 
Calculation of the Summary Indicators in Alesina et al. (2001): 
Integers calculated by Cerniglia & Pagani (2007) 
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Eurobarometer Data on Preferences of EU-citizens 
 
 
Defence
Date 
Should be decided by 
the (NATIONAL) 
government/mainly at 
national level 
Should be 
decided 
mainly at 
European 
Union level 
Should be 
decided jointly 
within the 
European 
Union/both at 
national and 
European Union 
level 
DK - 
Don't 
know 
12/1995 44%  0%  51%  4%  
01/1996 49%  0%  44%  7%  
05/1996 27%  29%  39%  5%  
11/1996 44%  0%  51%  5%  
04/1997 42%  0%  52%  6%  
11/1997 44%  0%  50%  6%  
05/1998 43%  0%  50%  6%  
11/1998 44%  0%  50%  6%  
04/1999 48%  0%  45%  7%  
11/1999 46%  0%  48%  5%  
06/2000 46%  0%  49%  5%  
01/2001 48%  0%  47%  5%  
11/2001 45%  0%  51%  4%  
11/2003 45.30%  -- 50%  4.80%  
© European Union, 1995-2010 
 
 
Environment 
Date 
Should be decided by 
the (NATIONAL) 
government/mainly at 
national level 
Should be 
decided 
mainly at 
European 
Union level 
Should be decided 
jointly within the 
European 
Union/both at 
national and 
European Union 
level 
DK - 
Don't 
know 
06/1995 27%  0%  69%  4%  
12/1995 30%  0%  66%  3%  
01/1996 26%  0%  69%  4%  
05/1996 18%  30%  49%  3%  
11/1996 32%  0%  65%  3%  
04/1997 33%  0%  63%  4%  
11/1997 32%  0%  64%  4%  
05/1998 33%  0%  63%  4%  
11/1998 30%  0%  66%  4%  
04/1999 40%  55%  5%  0%  
11/1999 37%  0%  58%  4%  
06/2000 38%  0%  58%  4%  
01/2001 37%  0%  59%  4%  
11/2001 33%  0%  64%  3%  
11/2003 33.90%  -- 61.80%  4.30%  
© European Union, 1995-2010 
Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged and mentionned.  
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Currency 
 
Date 
Should be decided by 
the (NATIONAL) 
government/mainly at 
national level 
Should be 
decided 
mainly at 
European 
Union level 
Should be 
decided jointly 
within the 
European 
Union/both at 
national and 
European Union 
level 
DK - 
Don't 
know 
06/1995 35%  0%  58%  7%  
12/1995 33%  0%  62%  5%  
01/1996 39%  0%  54%  7%  
05/1996 28%  29%  37%  5%  
11/1996 40%  0%  54%  6%  
04/1997 42%  0%  51%  7%  
11/1997 38%  0%  54%  7%  
05/1998 28%  0%  65%  6%  
11/1998 28%  0%  67%  5%  
04/1999 33%  0%  61%  6%  
11/1999 35%  0%  59%  5%  
06/2000 36%  0%  59%  5%  
01/2001 39%  0%  57%  4%  
11/2001 31%  0%  65%  4%  
11/2003 32%  -- 63.30%  4.60%  
© European Union, 1995-2010 
Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged and mentionned.  
 
 
 
Health & Social Wellfare 
Date 
Should be decided by 
the (NATIONAL) 
government/mainly at 
national level 
Should be 
decided 
mainly at 
European 
Union level 
Should be 
decided jointly 
within the 
European 
Union/both at 
national and 
European Union 
level 
DK - 
Don't 
know 
06/1995 54%  0%  41%  5%  
12/1995 59%  0%  36%  4%  
01/1996 56%  0%  39%  5%  
05/1996 40%  18%  37%  5%  
11/1996 61%  0%  34%  4%  
04/1997 62%  0%  33%  5%  
11/1997 62%  0%  33%  5%  
05/1998 60%  0%  35%  5%  
11/1998 61%  0%  34%  4%  
04/1999 65%  0%  30%  5%  
11/1999 62%  0%  34%  4%  
06/2000 62%  0%  33%  4%  
01/2001 64%  0%  32%  4%  
11/2001 59%  0%  37%  4%  
11/2003 67%  -- 28.90%  4.10%  
© European Union, 1995-2010 
Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged and mentionned 
 
 
 79
Media 
Date 
Should be decided by 
the (NATIONAL) 
government 
Should be decided jointly 
within the European 
Community/Union 
DK - 
Don't 
know 
06/1995 46%  45%  9%  
12/1995 54%  39%  6%  
01/1996 53%  37%  9%  
11/1996 52%  41%  6%  
04/1997 52%  40%  8%  
11/1997 50%  42%  8%  
05/1998 52%  40%  8%  
11/1998 55%  38%  7%  
04/1999 58%  33%  8%  
11/1999 58%  34%  7%  
06/2000 58%  35%  7%  
01/2001 60%  34%  7%  
11/2001 56%  38%  6%  
11/2003 59.70%  33.60%  6.80%  
© European Union, 1995-2010 
Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged and mentionned.  
 
 
Unemployment
Date 
Should be decided by 
the (NATIONAL) 
government 
Should be decided jointly 
within the European 
Community/Union 
DK - 
Don't 
know 
12/1995 39%  57%  4%  
01/1996 37%  59%  4%  
11/1996 43%  53%  4%  
04/1997 45%  51%  4%  
11/1997 41%  55%  4%  
05/1998 42%  53%  4%  
11/1998 40%  56%  4%  
04/1999 47%  48%  4%  
11/1999 44%  52%  4%  
06/2000 42%  54%  4%  
01/2001 45%  51%  4%  
11/2001 43%  53%  3%  
11/2003 52.80%  43.70%  3.50%  
© European Union, 1995-2010 
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Regional Aid
Date 
Should be decided by 
the (NATIONAL) 
government 
Should be decided jointly 
within the European 
Community/Union 
DK - 
Don't 
know 
06/1995 26%  67%  7%  
12/1995 32%  61%  7%  
01/1996 30%  62%  8%  
11/1996 32%  63%  5%  
04/1997 32%  61%  7%  
11/1997 31%  61%  7%  
05/1998 30%  63%  7%  
11/1998 29%  64%  6%  
04/1999 33%  59%  7%  
11/1999 33%  60%  6%  
06/2000 35%  59%  6%  
01/2001 34%  60%  6%  
11/2001 32%  63%  5%  
11/2003 36.30%  57.50%  6.20%  
© European Union, 1995-2010 
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Education
Date 
Should be decided by 
the (NATIONAL) 
government/mainly at 
national level 
Should be 
decided 
mainly at 
European 
Union level 
Should be 
decided jointly 
within the 
European 
Union/both at 
national and 
European Union 
level 
DK - 
Don't 
know 
06/1995 55%  0%  40%  5%  
12/1995 67%  0%  29%  3%  
01/1996 58%  0%  37%  5%  
05/1996 40%  18%  38%  4%  
11/1996 59%  0%  37%  4%  
04/1997 60%  0%  35%  5%  
11/1997 62%  0%  33%  5%  
05/1998 59%  0%  36%  5%  
11/1998 60%  0%  35%  4%  
04/1999 66%  0%  29%  5%  
11/1999 62%  0%  34%  4%  
06/2000 62%  0%  33%  4%  
01/2001 64%  0%  32%  4%  
11/2001 61%  0%  35%  4%  
11/2003 64.30%  -- 31.50%  4.10%  
© European Union, 1995-2010 
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Research
Date 
Should be decided by 
the (NATIONAL) 
government/mainly at 
national level 
Should be 
decided 
mainly at 
European 
Union level 
Should be 
decided jointly 
within the 
European 
Union/both at 
national and 
European Union 
level 
DK - 
Don't 
know 
06/1995 18%  0%  75%  6%  
12/1995 25%  0%  70%  5%  
01/1996 22%  0%  71%  7%  
05/1996 14%  30%  51%  5%  
11/1996 25%  0%  70%  5%  
04/1997 27%  0%  67%  6%  
11/1997 26%  0%  67%  6%  
05/1998 24%  0%  69%  7%  
11/1998 24%  0%  70%  6%  
04/1999 30%  0%  63%  7%  
11/1999 29%  0%  65%  5%  
06/2000 29%  0%  65%  6%  
01/2001 27%  0%  67%  5%  
11/2001 27%  0%  68%  5%  
11/2003 27.90%  -- 66.30%  5.80%  
© European Union, 1995-2010 
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Foreign Policy
Date 
Should be decided by 
the (NATIONAL) 
government/mainly at 
national level 
Should be 
decided 
mainly at 
European 
Union level 
Should be 
decided jointly 
within the 
European 
Union/both at 
national and 
European Union 
level 
DK - 
Don't 
know 
06/1995 20%  0%  70%  9%  
12/1995 22%  0%  70%  8%  
01/1996 23%  0%  67%  10%  
05/1996 22%  29%  43%  7%  
11/1996 23%  0%  69%  7%  
04/1997 23%  0%  68%  9%  
11/1997 22%  0%  68%  10%  
05/1998 21%  0%  70%  9%  
11/1998 21%  0%  71%  8%  
04/1999 23%  0%  68%  9%  
11/1999 22%  0%  69%  8%  
06/2000 23%  0%  69%  8%  
01/2001 23%  0%  69%  8%  
11/2001 22%  0%  71%  7%  
11/2003 19.90%  -- 72.40%  7.70%  
© European Union, 1995-2010 
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Culture 
Date 
Should be decided by 
the (NATIONAL) 
government 
Should be decided jointly 
within the European 
Community/Union 
DK - 
Don't 
know 
06/1995 50%  42%  7%  
12/1995 60%  34%  6%  
01/1996 57%  34%  9%  
11/1996 56%  38%  6%  
04/1997 55%  37%  7%  
11/1997 56%  35%  8%  
05/1998 53%  39%  8%  
11/1998 56%  37%  7%  
04/1999 59%  32%  8%  
11/1999 52%  39%  8%  
06/2000 56%  37%  7%  
01/2001 56%  36%  7%  
11/2001 49%  44%  6%  
11/2003 51%  41.50%  7.50%  
© European Union, 1995-2010 
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Immigration
Date 
Should be decided by the 
(NATIONAL) 
government/mainly at 
national level 
Should be decided jointly 
within the European 
Union/both at national 
and European Union level 
DK - 
Don't 
know 
06/1995 36%  58%  6%  
12/1995 37%  57%  6%  
01/1996 34%  59%  6%  
11/1996 41%  54%  6%  
04/1997 39%  55%  6%  
11/1997 40%  54%  6%  
05/1998 37%  57%  6%  
11/1998 37%  57%  5%  
04/1999 39%  54%  6%  
11/1999 46%  49%  5%  
06/2000 49%  46%  5%  
01/2001 49%  46%  5%  
11/2001 48%  48%  4%  
11/2003 44.60%  51.40%  3.90%  
© European Union, 1995-2010 
Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged and mentionned.  
 
 
Political Asylum
Date 
Should be 
decided by the 
(NATIONAL) 
government 
Should be 
decided 
mainly at 
European 
Union level 
Should be decided 
jointly within the 
European 
Community/Union 
DK - 
Don't 
know 
06/1995 33%  0%  59%  8%  
12/1995 37%  0%  55%  7%  
01/1996 35%  0%  56%  9%  
05/1996 25%  27%  41%  6%  
11/1996 38%  0%  55%  7%  
04/1997 38%  0%  54%  8%  
11/1997 38%  0%  53%  8%  
05/1998 36%  0%  55%  8%  
11/1998 37%  0%  55%  7%  
04/1999 40%  0%  52%  8%  
11/1999 43%  0%  51%  6%  
06/2000 48%  0%  46%  6%  
01/2001 46%  0%  48%  5%  
11/2001 45%  0%  51%  4%  
11/2003 41.40%  -- 53.20%  5.40%  
© European Union, 1995-2010 
Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged and mentionned.  
 
 
 83
Drugs
Date 
Should be decided by 
the (NATIONAL) 
government 
Should be decided jointly 
within the European 
Community/Union 
DK - 
Don't 
know 
06/1995 19%  77%  4%  
12/1995 19%  77%  3%  
01/1996 19%  77%  4%  
11/1996 24%  73%  4%  
04/1997 26%  69%  4%  
11/1997 25%  71%  4%  
05/1998 23%  72%  5%  
11/1998 24%  72%  4%  
04/1999 30%  66%  4%  
11/1999 28%  67%  4%  
06/2000 30%  66%  4%  
01/2001 29%  68%  3%  
11/2001 26%  71%  3%  
11/2003 28.90%  67.50%  3.70%  
© European Union, 1995-2010 
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Poverty
Date 
Should be decided by 
the (NATIONAL) 
government 
Should be decided jointly 
within the European 
Community/Union 
DK - 
Don't 
know 
04/1993 29%  66%  4%  
11/1998 30%  65%  5%  
04/1999 35%  60%  5%  
11/1999 34%  61%  5%  
06/2000 33%  63%  4%  
01/2001 33%  63%  4%  
11/2001 30%  66%  4%  
11/2003 39.40%  56.50%  4%  
© European Union, 1995-2010 
Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged and mentionned.  
 
 
Humanitarian Aid
Date 
Should be decided by 
the (NATIONAL) 
government 
Should be decided jointly 
within the European 
Community/Union 
DK - 
Don't 
know 
11/1998 25%  70%  5%  
04/1999 29%  65%  6%  
11/1999 28%  67%  5%  
06/2000 28%  67%  5%  
01/2001 28%  68%  5%  
11/2001 24%  72%  4%  
11/2003 26.10%  69.10%  4.80%  
© European Union, 1995-2010 
Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged and mentionned.  
 
 
Agriculture
Date 
Should be decided by 
the (NATIONAL) 
government 
Should be decided jointly 
within the European 
Community/Union 
DK - 
Don't 
know 
06/1995 41%  52%  7%  
12/1995 45%  50%  5%  
01/1996 40%  53%  7%  
© European Union, 1995-2010 
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Agriculture and Fisheries  
Date 
Should be decided by 
the (NATIONAL) 
government/mainly at 
national level 
Should be 
decided 
mainly at 
European 
Union level 
Should be 
decided jointly 
within the 
European 
Union/both at 
national and 
European Union 
level 
DK - 
Don't 
know 
05/1996 36%  21%  38%  6%  
11/1996 44%  0%  49%  6%  
04/1997 43%  0%  50%  7%  
11/1997 41%  0%  51%  8%  
05/1998 42%  0%  50%  9%  
11/1998 41%  0%  51%  8%  
04/1999 47%  0%  45%  8%  
11/1999 44%  0%  48%  7%  
06/2000 47%  0%  46%  7%  
01/2001 45%  0%  48%  7%  
11/2001 40%  0%  53%  6%  
11/2003 42.50%  -- 50.10%  7.30%  
© European Union, 1995-2010 
Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged and mentionned.  
 
 
 
Crime 
Date 
Should be decided by 
the (NATIONAL) 
government 
Should be decided jointly 
within the European 
Community/Union 
DK - 
Don't 
know 
11/1999 29%  67%  4%  
06/2000 31%  65%  4%  
01/2001 29%  67%  4%  
11/2001 25%  72%  3%  
11/2003 25.40%  70.90%  3.70%  
© European Union, 1995-2010 
Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged and mentionned.  
 
 
Police
Date 
Should be decided by 
the (NATIONAL) 
government 
Should be decided jointly 
within the European 
Community/Union 
DK - 
Don't 
know 
11/1999 63%  33%  4%  
06/2000 64%  32%  4%  
01/2001 67%  29%  4%  
11/2001 63%  34%  4%  
11/2003 69.60%  26.90%  3.40%  
© European Union, 1995-2010 
Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged and mentionned.  
 
 
Justice
Date 
Should be decided by 
the (NATIONAL) 
government 
Should be decided jointly 
within the European 
Community/Union 
DK - 
Don't 
know 
11/1999 58%  38%  4%  
06/2000 60%  36%  5%  
01/2001 62%  34%  4%  
11/2001 58%  38%  4%  
11/2003 64.80%  31.50%  3.70%  
© European Union, 1995-2010 
Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged and mentionned.  
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Accepting Refugees
Date 
Should be decided by 
the (NATIONAL) 
government 
Should be decided jointly 
within the European 
Community/Union 
DK - 
Don't 
know 
11/1999 42%  53%  5%  
06/2000 47%  48%  5%  
01/2001 44%  51%  5%  
11/2001 43%  53%  4%  
11/2003 42.90%  52.60%  4.60%  
© European Union, 1995-2010 
Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged and mentionned.  
 
 
Juvenile Crime Prevention
Date 
Should be decided by 
the (NATIONAL) 
government 
Should be decided jointly 
within the European 
Community/Union 
DK - 
Don't 
know 
11/1999 51%  44%  4%  
06/2000 53%  43%  4%  
01/2001 53%  43%  4%  
11/2001 51%  45%  4%  
11/2003 58.30%  37.50%  4.20%  
© European Union, 1995-2010 
Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged and mentionned.  
 
 
Urban Crime Prevention
Date 
Should be decided by 
the (NATIONAL) 
government 
Should be decided jointly 
within the European 
Community/Union 
DK - 
Don't 
know 
11/1999 57%  38%  4%  
06/2000 57%  38%  4%  
01/2001 59%  37%  4%  
11/2001 56%  40%  4%  
11/2003 62.70%  33.10%  4.20%  
© European Union, 1995-2010 
Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged and mentionned.  
 
 
 
Terrorism
Date 
Should be decided by 
the (NATIONAL) 
government 
Should be decided jointly 
within the European 
Community/Union 
DK - 
Don't 
know 
11/2001 12%  85%  3%  
11/2003 12.50%  83.70%  3.80%  
© European Union, 1995-2010 
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Aging
Date 
DK - Don't 
know 
(NATIONALITY) 
Government 
Jointly within the 
European Union 
11/2003 9.20%  42.40%  48.40%  
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Zusammenfassung: 
 
Meine Magisterarbeit beschäftigt sich mit der Output-Legitimität der Europäischen 
Union (EU). Ich fasse zuerst die Entwicklung der Legitimitätstheorien in Bezug auf 
die EU zusammen, um zu zeigen, dass im Lichte der momentan stockenden 
demokratischen Entwicklung der EU der Output-Legitimität wieder größere 
Bedeutung zugemessen wird und untersuche dann empirisch ob diese überhaupt 
hält was sie verspricht, in dem ich die Präferenzen der EU-Bürger hinsichtlich der 
Kompetenzverteilung der EU mit der tatsächlichen Kompetenzverteilung in der EU 
vergleiche. In einigen Politikfeldern stimmen die Präferenzen und die tatsächliche 
Verteilung kaum überein – Output-Legitimität ist also nicht unfehlbar.  
 
 
Abstract 
 
In my Magisterthesis, I compare citizen preferences towards the allocation of 
competences in the European Union (EU) with the actual empirical allocation of 
competences in order to test the quality of the Union’s output legitimacy. I start with a 
literary review of legitimacy theory concerning the EU and find that, with the halting 
republican democratic development, there has been a re-discovering of output-
legitimacy. However, my empirical findings suggest, that output-legitimacy might not 
be as strong as traditionally assumed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
